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Abstract
Microarray technology allows for the evaluation of the level of expression of thousands of genes in a sample of cells under
a given condition. In this paper, we introduce a methodology based on cooperative Game Theory for the selection of groups of
genes with high power in classifying samples, according to gene expression patterns. The connection between microarray games
and classification games is discussed and the use of the Shapley value to measure the power of genes for classification is motivated
on particular instances and compared to the interaction index.
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1. Introduction
Gene expression data analysis requires suitable tools for storing and managing relevant amount of data; one of
the most recent and useful technologies is related to microarrays, that allow for the storage in a consistent matrix of
expression data. The rows (possibly thousands) index the genes, the columns (usually in the order of units or tens)
are assigned to the study samples and the values in the matrix represent the level of expressions of the genes in the
samples (see for instance [1,2]).
Many models for data analysis have been presented in the literature for inferring, from a matrix of gene expression
data, the role of genes, their interactions and their behaviours when changes in condition of the biological system
occur [3–5].
Complex experimental artefacts associated with microarray data collection have been described, emphasizing the
need for statistical treatment of data during all the stages of the experiment. This includes the design of the slides,
the quality assessment, the normalization process and the standardization process [6–8] and other preprocessing data
analysis [2,8] with the objective of removing systematic variation in microarray experiments.
I The authors are grateful to Fioravante Patrone for useful discussions on this subject.
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Throughout this paper, we work on a matrix of gene expression values that have been already preprocessed,
according to previous methods.
We suppose also that the data are stored in a boolean format, with 1 referring to an abnormally expressed gene
in the sample and 0 indicating a normal expression of the gene. This task is very hard and important as it involves
the identification of lower and upper bounds on the levels of expression of each gene in order to identify the normal
values. It must be remarked that a biased evaluation of the normal range may deeply influence the quality of the data
and consequently the results obtained managing them.
The goal of many analytical methods applied to gene expression datasets is to develop a classification rule, that is a
criterion to predict, as accurately as possible, the true class of samples. Suppose that some samples are collected from
a class of tumors and some other from normal tissues, and their labels with respect to these two classes are known.
The idea is to use in some way the information available either on single genes or on combination of genes as a tool
for classifying the samples into the right classes.
An advantage of these methods is the easy way to evaluate their performance, referring to the proportion of
correct classification and the proportion of misclassifications on the gene expression matrix where the original
tumour class of samples is known (training set). On the other hand, from the mathematical point of view, a
relevant problem in the applications of methods for classification to gene expression data-set is the number of
genes much greater than the number of samples. By retaining such a large number of genes, it is incredibly
easy for such methods to find good-looking but nonreproducible and meaningless classification rules, with
high (low) rate of correct classifications (misclassifications) on the training set and very high (low) rate of
misclassifications (correct classifications) on the gene expression data where the information on tumour classes is
unknown.
Since most of the genes contribute to add noise and to obfuscate the separation between classes, only few
genes are able to perform almost correct discriminations. In order to select the set of genes (features) with the
best performance in classifying samples, the analytical method must solve a very hard problem: maximize the
proportion of correct classification and minimize the number of misclassifications in the dataset under consideration.
We refer to this problem as a classification problem. In this context, many filtering strategies to reduce the
number of genes have been proposed [2,8], which mainly look at the performance in classification of each
individual gene. A big problem in this respect is that there may exist a set of genes that together act as a
classifier, but each individual gene in the set does not, making them good candidates for being filtered out all
together.
In this paper we describe a game theoretical methodology to select subsets of genes with good performance in
classification. This is not the first time that game theory has been suggested to tackle the prediction problem. In [9]
a general framework based on fuzzy measures is introduced to study classification problems. In that paper, a fuzzy
measure is used to represents the discriminating power of features for recognizing a given class among the others.
Then, this information is comprehensively resumed by an index to select the best features.
Here, we build a cooperative game, with the genes in the role of players, whose aim is to stress the performance of
groups of genes for the classification of samples. Then we use the Shapley index [10] and the interaction index [9,11]
to select those genes or groups of genes with high performance in classifying samples. Further, we study such games
and the results provided by such indices in connection with another class of games build on gene expression data-
sets, i.e. the microarray games [12,13], whose analysis is aimed to point at the most influential genes in causing the
biological condition of interest.
The game theoretical approach may capture some features of the problem, other methods may not. We refer to the
possibility of taking into account not only the role played by a single gene or a set of genes independently, but also its
or their behaviour in correlation with other genes, or the influence that a gene may have on the classification problem
when it is taken into consideration together with another group of genes already selected as indicators.
As we will show in Section 3, classification games proposed in this paper are perfectly embedded in the context
proposed by Grabisch [9], being a particular instance of two cooperative games whose characteristic functions are
fuzzy measure following the definition in [9].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall some elements of Game Theory. In Section 3 the
notion of classification games is introduced and some properties are studied. In Section 4 the interaction index [11]
on classification games is compared to the Shapley value. Finally Section 5 concludes and addresses some future
researches.
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2. Preliminaries
In this section we introduce some basic game theoretical concepts. A cooperative game with transferable utility or
TU-game, is a pair (N , v), where N denotes the finite set of players and v : 2N → R the characteristic function, with
v(∅) = 0. Often we identify a TU-game (N , v) with the corresponding characteristic function v. A group of players
T ⊆ N is called a coalition and v(T ) is the value of the coalition. A TU-game (N , w) such that w : 2N → [0, 1] is
called a [0, 1]-game.
The unanimity game (N , uR) based on R ⊆ N is the game described by uR(T ) = 1 if R ⊆ T and uR(T ) = 0,
otherwise. Every TU-game (N , v) can be written as a linear combination of unanimity games in a unique way, i.e.
v =∑S⊆N ,S 6=∅ λS(v)uS (see for instance [14,15]). The coefficients (λS(v))S∈2N \{∅} are called unanimity coefficients
or dividends of the game (N , v).
The dual unanimity game (N , u∗R) based on R ⊆ N is the game described by u∗R(T ) = 1 if R ∩ T 6= ∅ and
u∗R(T ) = 0, otherwise. Every TU-game (N , v) can also be written as a linear combination of dual unanimity games
in a unique way, i.e. v =∑S⊆N ,S 6=∅ λ∗S(v)u∗S . The coefficients (λ∗S(v))S∈2N \{∅} are called dual unanimity coefficients
of the game (N , v).
Given a TU-game (N , v), an allocation or payoff vector is a vector (xi )i∈N ∈ RN assigning to player i ∈ N the
amount xi . An allocation (xi )i∈N ∈ RN is efficient if∑i∈N xi = v(N ).
A solution for a class of TU-games is a function ψ that assigns a payoff vector ψ(v) to every TU-game in the class.
A well-known solution for TU-games is the Shapley value, introduced by Shapley [10].
The Shapley value assigns to each player his average marginal contribution over all the possible orderings,
i.e. permutations, of the players. Formally, given a game G = (N , v), the Shapley value assigns to player i ∈ N :
φi (v) = 1n!
∑
pi
(v(P(pi; i) ∪ {i})− v(P(pi; i))) (1)
where pi is a permutation of the players and P(pi; i) is the set of players that precede player i in the permutation pi .
An alternative representation of the Shapley value can be given in terms of the unanimity coefficients
(λS(v))S∈2N \{∅} or in terms of the dual unanimity coefficients (λ∗S(v))S∈2N \{∅} of a game (N , v), that is:
φi (v) =
∑
S⊆N :i∈S
λS(v)
s
=
∑
S⊆N :i∈S
λ∗S(v)
s
(2)
for each i ∈ N . Now, we may go into more technical details, recalling the required basic definitions introduced in [12].
Let a be a n-dimensional boolean vector in {0, 1}n , n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. We define the support of a, denoted by sp(a), the
set
sp(a) = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | ai = 1}.
Let B ∈ {0, 1}n×k , n, k ∈ {1, 2, . . .} be a boolean matrix. We define the microarray game corresponding to B as the
TU-game (N , v¯) such that N = {1, . . . , n} and v¯ : 2N → R+ is such that v¯(T ) is the rate of occurrences of the
coalition T as a superset of the supports in the abnormal expression matrix B; in formula
v¯(T ) =
{ |Θ(T )|
k
if T ∈ 2N \ {∅}
0 if T = ∅
(3)
where |Θ(T )| is the cardinality of the set
Θ(T ) = { j ∈ {1, . . . , k} | sp(B j ) ⊆ T, sp(B j ) 6= ∅}
and B j represents the column j in B.
Equivalently, the game (N , v¯) can be represented via the relation
v¯(T ) =
∑
j=1,...,k
usp(B j )(T )
k
, T ∈ 2N \ ∅ (4)
where (N , usp(B j )) is the unanimity game on the set sp(B j ).
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Example 1. Consider the boolean matrix B ∈ {0, 1}4×3 such that
B =

1 0 1
0 1 1
1 1 0
0 0 1
 .
Then sp(B1) = {1, 3}, sp(B2) = {2, 3} and sp(B3) = {1, 2, 4}. By Eq. (4) the corresponding microarray game
({1, 2, 3, 4}, v) is such that
v = 1
3
(
u{1,3} + u{2,3} + u{1,2,4}
)
.
It follows that v(∅) = v({1}) = v({2}) = v({3}) = v({4}) = v({1, 4}) = v({2, 4}) = v({1, 2}) = v({3, 4}) = 0;
v({1, 3}) = v({2, 3}) = v({1, 3, 4}) = v({2, 3, 4}) = v({1, 2, 4}) = 13 ; v({1, 2, 3}) = 23 , v({1, 2, 3, 4}) = 1. The
Shapley value of the microarray game ({1, 2, 3, 4}, v) is ( 518 , 518 , 13 , 19 ).
3. Classification games
In this section, we consider the following question: is the Shapley value of a microarray game of any help in
studying the ability of genes in well classifying tumour samples according to a certain classification rule?
First note that the Shapley value of a microarray game seems meaningless as classification index, since a microarray
game does not consider any classification information in its characteristic function. On the other hand, intuitions based
on the results provided by the application of the Shapley value on microarray games [12,13] seem to go in the direction
of a positive answer. Before giving an analytical explanation of this fact, first we need to introduce a very simple
classification rule based on boolean data.
For simplicity, we will consider only two classes, let us say the biological conditions 1 and 2. As we said in
the Introduction, we will refer to a boolean gene expression matrix, where the boolean values 0–1 represent two
complementary expression properties, for example the property of normal expression (coded by 0) and the property
of abnormal expression (coded by 1). Note that the expression of a gene is a continuous variable which hypothetically
may assume whatever value across different samples, then it is not at all easy to identify good criteria to discriminate
between different expression properties. Being the goal of this paper to illustrate a methodology based on Game
Theory to select groups of genes or features with high classification power, we do not enter here into details on how
to solve the binarization problem (see for instance [13] for an algorithm used to binarize continuous gene expression
data).
Let B1 ∈ {0, 1}n×k1 and B2 ∈ {0, 1}n×k2 be two boolean gene expression matrices, where n is the number of
genes, k1 is the number of samples under the biological condition 1 (e.g. samples from normal tissues), k2 is the
number of samples under the biological condition 2 (e.g. samples from tumor tissues) and if Bti j = 1 for some
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} = N , j ∈ Kt = {1, . . . , kt } and t ∈ {1, 2}, then it means that gene i in sample j and condition t shows
a certain expression property (e.g. it is abnormally expressed) and if Bti j = 0 then it means that gene i in sample j
and condition t does not show such expression property.
Consider the following classification rule based on the subset of genes S ∈ 2N \ {∅}:
〈if there exists i ∈ S such that Bti j = 1, then classify sample j ∈ Kt under the biological condition t ∈{1, 2} in class 1〉. (F)
Remark 1. One could object that such a classification rule is naive or too extreme, and that a more conservative
rule should be considered, where, for instance, the decision is taken according to the value of the majority of the
players inside each coalition or according to some logical combination of expression properties 0 and 1 on each
possible coalition. We choose to use rule (F)mainly because of its easy application on numerical examples illustrating
the general methodology and for interesting similarity with other models involving game theory in gene expression
analysis. There are not any a priori theoretical constraints to the application of more sophisticated classification rules.
Let rFc (S) be the rate of correct classifications provided by the classification rule (F) applied on the dataset
(Bt )t∈{1,2} using the set of genes S ∈ 2N \{∅} and let rFm (S) be the rate of misclassifications made via the classification
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rule (F) applied on the dataset (Bt )t∈{1,2} using the set of genes S. Then, we define the classification game (N , dF)
as the TU-game on N with the characteristic function dF : 2N → [−1, 1] such that
dF(S) = rFc (S)− rFm (S), (5)
where dF(S) is called the discrimination rate of coalition S, for each S ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
Remark 2. It is possible to define a classification game with the aim of classifying samples under condition 2, that
is calculating the rate of good classifications on matrix B2 and the rate of misclassifications on matrix B1. The new
classification rule (•) could be defined as the following:
〈if sample j ∈ Kt , t ∈ {1, 2}, is not classified in class 1 according to the classification rule (F) based on S,
then classify sample j ∈ Kt under the biological condition t ∈ {1, 2}in class 2〉, (•)
for each S ∈ 2N \ ∅. Note that the classification game (N , d•) according to relation (5), is such that
d•(S) = (1− rFc (S))− (1− rFm (S)) = −dF(S)
for each coalition S ∈ 2N \ ∅.
In our approach we chose to consider the game provided by the difference between the two rates rFc and
rFm , following, in principle, a cost-benefit approach where for a coalition S the cost is represented by its rate of
misclassifications, rFm (S), and the benefit by its rate of correct classifications, r
F
c (S). However, not all the coalitions
S ∈ argmaxS⊆N dF(S) necessarily solve the problem of contemporarily maximizing the rate of correct classifications
rFc and minimizing the rate of misclassifications r
F
m . Moreover, the multiplicity of coalitions with discrimination rate
very close to the maximum value of dF could make the problem of selecting the discriminating genes even harder. In
fact, random fluctuations in expression values of few genes, mainly due to stochastic noise affecting the experimental
procedures, may heavily affect the evaluation of the discrimination rate of many coalitions of genes. In order to
avoid a biased selection of genes, and filter out those genes which makes the application of the classification rule
nonreproducible, our advice is to look at the interaction of each possible subgroup of genes. As it is suggested in [9],
such interaction is well summarized by the Shapley values φi (dF) and φi (d•), for each i ∈ N , which provide an
indication of the ability of gene i in discriminating the class 1 and 2, as the average contribution of a single gene i in
the recognition of class 1 and 2, respectively. The following example shows the ability of the Shapley value to filter
out nonreliable genes on a particular instance.
Example 2. Consider the following boolean matrices:
B¯
1 =

1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
 , B¯2 =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
 .
Then sp(B¯
1
1) = {1, 2}, sp(B¯12) = {1}, sp(B¯13) = {2}, sp(B¯14) = {1, 2, 3}, and sp(B¯21) = {1}, sp(B¯22) = {2},
sp(B¯
2
3) = {4}, sp(B¯24) = {4}.
The classification game ({1, 2, 3, 4}, d¯F) corresponding to B¯t , t ∈ {1, 2} and to the classification rule (F) is shown
in Table 1. Note that there are exactly 6 coalitions which reach the maximum discrimination rate according to the rule
(F). On the other hand, gene 3 is expressed at level 1 only on one sample out of eight. So, it seems unrealistic to
consider the expression property 1 observed for gene 3 in the fourth column of matrix B¯
1
as a reliable measure of
the state of that gene in the corresponding sample. Consequently, coalitions {1, 3}, {2, 3} and {1, 2, 3}, which get the
maximum discrimination rate in the game, should be considered affected by the biased contribution of gene 3. These
considerations have been effectively resumed by the Shapley value φ(d¯F), which assigns to gene 3 less than one half
of the power allocated to players 1 and 2, as shown in Table 2.
In Proposition 1 we will clarify the connections between the concept of relevance for genes on microarray games
and the concept of classification power for genes on classification games. The following remark makes its proof
straightforward.
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Table 1
The four-player classification game d¯F together with the game on the rate of correct classifications r¯Fc and the game on the rate of misclassifications
r¯Fm
S: ∅ {1} {2} {3} {4} {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4}
r¯Fc (S) 0 34
3
4
1
4 0
4
4
3
4
3
4
r¯Fm (S) 0 14
1
4 0
2
4
2
4
1
4
3
4
d¯F(S) 0 24
2
4
1
4 − 24 24 24 0
S: {2, 3} {2, 4} {3, 4} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4} {1, 2, 3, 4}
r¯Fc (S) 34
3
4
1
4
4
4
4
4
3
4
3
4
4
4
r¯Fm (S) 14
3
4
2
4
2
4
4
4
3
4
3
4
4
4
d¯F(S) 24 0 − 14 24 0 0 0 0
Table 2
The Shapley values of games r¯Fc , r¯
F
m and d¯F, respectively
Player φ(r¯Fc ) φ(r¯
F
m ) φ(d¯
F)
1 1124
6
24
5
24
2 1124
6
24
5
24
3 224 0
2
24
4 0 1224
−12
24
Remark 3. We can provide an alternative definition of classification game using dual unanimity games, which will
be useful later.
Relation (5) can be rewritten as follows:
dF(S) = |Ω(S)|
k1
− |∆(S)|
k2
(6)
where |Ω(S)| is the cardinality of the set
Ω(S) = { j ∈ {1, . . . , k1}|sp(B1j ) ∩ S 6= ∅}
and v¯(∅) = 0 and |∆(S)| is the cardinality of the set
∆(S) = { j ∈ {1, . . . , k2}|sp(B2j ) ∩ S 6= ∅}
and dF(∅) = 0. As a consequence
rFc (S) =
∑
j=1,...,k1
u∗
sp(B1j )
(S)
k1
(7)
and
rFm (S) =
∑
j=1,...,k2
u∗
sp(B2j )
(S)
k2
(8)
for each S ∈ 2N \ ∅, where (N , u∗
sp(Btj )
) is the dual unanimity game on the set sp(Btj ), t ∈ {1, 2}.
Proposition 1. Let B1 ∈ {0, 1}n×k1 and B2 ∈ {0, 1}n×k2 be two boolean matrices. Let (N , v1) be the microarray
game corresponding to B1 and Let (N , v2) be the microarray game corresponding to B2. Moreover, let (N , dF) be
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the classification game corresponding to Bt , t ∈ {1, 2} and to classification rule (F). Then
φ(dF) = φ(v1)− φ(v2). (9)
Proof. A well known result for TU-games is that the Shapley value of a unanimity game on T ∈ 2N \ {∅}, φ(uT ), is
equal to the Shapley value of the dual unanimity game on T , φ(u∗T ), (see, for example, [15]). More precisely,
φi (uT ) = φi (u∗T ) =

1
|T | if i ∈ T
0 if i 6∈ T .
(10)
This simple expression for the Shapley value is a direct consequence of its properties. Then, the proof immediately
follows by relations (2), (4), (7) and (8). 
4. Interaction index of classification games
In this section, we analyse the behaviour of the Shapley value w.r.t. the interaction index [11] used in the fuzzy
context in [9]. The idea behind the interaction index is that the Shapley value is not able to fully describe the value of
a player. In fact, the Shapley value is a tool for averaging the marginal contribution of a player when he enters in a
coalition, so it may happen that even if two players, i and j , are assigned the highest Shapley value, the coalition of
the two players, {i, j}, has a low value. In our situation this means that the classification power of the pair of genes i
and j could be very low.
Given a game G = (N , v), the interaction index takes into account not only the marginal contributions of players
i, j ∈ N but correlates them with the marginal contribution of the coalition {i, j}. More precisely, it considers
the increasing (or decreasing) of the marginal contribution of the coalition of the two players w.r.t. the sum of the
marginal contributions of the two players. For each coalition S ⊆ N \ {i, j} we have to take into account the quantity
[v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S)] − [v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)] − [v(S ∪ { j})− v(S)] = v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S ∪ {i})− v(S ∪ { j})+ v(S).
In doing this we can consider all the possible orderings of the players in N in which i and j are neighbours, obtaining
the interaction index a´ la Shapley, or we can just consider the 2n−2 coalitions included in S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, obtaining
the interaction index a´ la Banzhaf [16].
The same reasoning allows to extend the definition of the interaction index to larger coalitions.
We recall the definition given in [11] of the interaction index that we will use in the following:
Definition 1. Given a game G = (N , v) the interaction index (a´ la Shapley) is given by:
I vSh(S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
(n − t − s)!t !
(n − s + 1)!
∑
L⊆S
(−1)s−lv(L ∪ T ), S ⊆ N .
As the authors remark the interaction index for a singleton coincides with the Shapley index.
Next proposition makes clear the connection between classification games and the fuzzy approach in [9].
Proposition 2. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of n genes studied on k1 + k2 samples, where k1 6= 0 and k2 6= 0 are the
number of samples under condition 1 and 2, respectively. Let B1 ∈ {0, 1}n×k1 and B2 ∈ {0, 1}n×k2 be two boolean
matrices such that sp(B1j ) 6= ∅ for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k1} and sp(B2l ) 6= ∅ for each l ∈ {1, . . . , k2}. Consider the maps
rFc , r
F
m : 2N → [0, 1] as defined in (5). Then:
(i) rFc (∅) = rFm (∅) = 0 and rFc (N ) = rFm (N ) = 1
(ii) for each S, T ∈ 2N , if S ⊆ T then rFc (S) ≤ rFc (T ) and rFm (S) ≤ rFm (T ) (monotonicity).
Proof. Condition (i) is trivial. Condition (ii) follows directly by relations (7) and (8) and the fact that dual unanimity
games are monotonic. 
As a consequence of Proposition 2, the maps rFc and r
F
m are fuzzy measures (see Definition 1 in [9]). In our case,
the set of attributes or features is the set of genes N and the set of classes corresponds to the set of two conditions
{1, 2}.
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Table 3
The three-player classification game dˆF together with the game on the rate of correct classifications rˆFc and the game on the rate of
misclassifications rˆFm
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
rˆFc (S) 34
3
4
1
4 1 1
3
4 1
rˆFm (S) 14
4
4
3
4 1 1 1 1
dˆF(S) 24 − 14 − 24 0 0 − 14 0
Table 4
The Shapley values of games rˆFc , rˆ
F
m and dˆF, respectively
Player φ(rˆFc ) φ(rˆ
F
m ) φ(dˆ
F)
1 48
1
8
3
8
2 38
4
8 − 18
3 18
3
8 − 28
Table 5
The interaction index of games rˆFc , rˆ
F
m and dˆF, respectively
S : {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
ISh(rˆ
F
c )
4
8
3
8
1
8 − 48 0 − 28 0
ISh(rˆ
F
m )
1
8
4
8
3
8 − 28 0 − 68 0
ISh(dˆ
F) 38 − 18 − 28 − 18 0 48 0
The following two examples show an opposite behaviour of Shapley value and interaction index on classification
games.
Example 3. Consider the following boolean matrices:
Bˆ
1 =
1 1 0 11 1 1 0
0 0 1 0
 , Bˆ2 =
1 0 0 01 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
 .
Then sp(Bˆ
1
1) = sp(Bˆ
1
2) = {1, 2}, sp(Bˆ
1
3) = {2, 3}, sp(Bˆ
1
4) = {1}, and sp(Bˆ
2
1) = {1, 2}, sp(Bˆ
2
2) = sp(Bˆ
2
3) = sp(Bˆ
2
4) =
{2, 3}.
The classification game ({1, 2, 3}, dˆF) corresponding to Bˆt , t ∈ {1, 2} and to classification rule (F) is shown in
Table 3. Consider the Shapley value φ(dˆF) shown in Table 4. According to this value, the player with the highest
classification power is player 1. Now, consider the interaction index ISh on game dˆF shown in Table 5, which assigns
a classification power to each coalition S ∈ 2N \ {∅}. According to the interaction index, the coalition with the highest
classification power seems to be coalition {2, 3}. In this example the Shapley value seems to work better than the
interaction index in selecting the group of genes with highest classification power. In fact, coalitions {1} and {2, 3}
have the same classification rate, but the misclassification rate of {1} is lower than the misclassification rate of {2, 3}.
Example 4. Consider the following boolean matrices:
B˜
1 =
1 1 1 1 01 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
 , B˜2 =
1 0 1 10 1 0 0
1 0 1 1
 .
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Table 6
The three-player classification game d˜F together with the game on the rate of correct classifications r˜Fc and the game on the rate of
misclassifications r˜Fm
S : {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
r˜Fc (S) 45
3
5
1
5
4
5 1
4
5 1
r˜Fm (S) 34
1
4
3
4 1
3
4 1 1
d˜F(S) 120
7
20 − 1120 − 420 520 − 420 0
Table 7
The Shapley value of games r˜Fc , r˜
F
m and d˜F, respectively
Player φ(r˜Fc ) φ(r˜
F
m ) φ(d˜
F)
1 2040
15
40
5
40
2 1240
10
40
2
40
3 840
15
40 − 740
Table 8
The interaction index of games r˜Fc , r˜
F
m and d˜F, respectively
S : {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
ISh(r˜
F
c )
20
40
12
40
8
40 − 2440 0 0 0
ISh(r˜
F
m )
15
40
10
40
15
40 0 − 3040 0 0
ISh(d˜
F) 540
2
40 − 740 − 2440 3040 0 0
Then sp(B˜
1
1) = sp(B˜12) = sp(B˜13) = {1, 2}, sp(B˜14) = {1}, sp(B˜15) = {3} and sp(B˜21) = sp(B˜23) = sp(B˜24) =
{1, 3}, sp(B˜22) = {2}.
The classification game ({1, 2, 3}, d˜F) corresponding to B˜t , t ∈ {1, 2} and to classification rule (F) is shown
in Table 6. Consider Shapley value φ(d˜F) shown in Table 7. According to this value, the player with the highest
classification power is player 1. Now, consider the interaction index ISh on game d˜F shown in Table 8. According
to the interaction index, the coalition with the highest classification power seems to be coalition {1, 3}. In this case
the interaction index seems to provide a more accurate description of the power of genes in discriminating the two
classes. In fact, coalitions {1} and {1, 3} have the same rate of misclassifications, but the rate of correct classifications
for coalition {1} is lower than the rate of correct classification of coalition {1, 3}.
5. Conclusions
The great potential of classification methods is to select predictive genes, i.e. those genes that, according to a
classification rule, could be exploited to predict the class of a new tumour sample of unknown class on the basis of
their expression profiles. With this goal, in this paper we suggest consideration of a classification game, based on an
appropriate classification rule, and then to look at those genes with the highest Shapley value: the higher the Shapley
value of a gene in the classification game, the greater the power of such a gene in classifying samples should be. In
particular, Example 2 shows the ability of the Shapley value in filtering out those coalitions of genes which seem
to be biased by stochastic noise on some observations. An alternative way to keep into account random fluctuations
has been suggested by Moretti [13,17], where a bootstrap procedure has been introduced to test the null hypothesis
of no difference between the Shapley values of microarray games under two different conditions, that is, in virtue
of Proposition 1, to test the null hypothesis that φi (dF) = 0. With respect to this, recall that in [12,13] the Shapley
value has been proposed to measure the relevance of genes in provoking a biological condition (e.g. a tumour) on a
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different class of games rooted on gene expression data, the class of microarray games. Classification games provide a
different interpretation of microarray games, in terms of the classification information contained in their characteristics
function, and, consequently, a different interpretation of the Shapley value.
On a particular instance, we also observed that some extra information on classification power of genes is provided
by the interaction index [11], a generalization of the Shapley value.
Finally, we want to stress that it would be very interesting to study classification games corresponding to more
complex classification rules, for example, based on Support Vector Machines [18] and other supervised classification
techniques applied to each coalition of genes. In this context, the Shapley value of classification games based on
different classification rules could be also informative in comparing the reliability of different classifiers.
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